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|On the Effectiveness of Traffic Analysis Against Anonymity Networks||Search for a title, author or keyword|
On the Effectiveness of Traffic Analysis Against Anonymity Networks
PDF document. On the Effectiveness of Traffic Analysis Against Anonymity Networks Using Flow Records. Anonymous communication networks hide the actual source (or destination) address of Internet traffic, preventing the server (or client) and other entities along the network from determining the actual identities of the communicating parties. Among others, Tor is probably the most widely used proxy-based low-latency anonymous communication network. In Tor, clients establish circuits through a chosen set of proxies, beginning with an entry node and reaching the final destination through an exit node. To offer acceptable quality of service, a distinctive characteristic of these systems is that they attempt to maintain packet inter-arrival times. Unfortunately, this makes them vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks, whereby an adversary with access to traffic entering and leaving entry and exit nodes can correlate seemingly unrelated traffic flows and reveal the actual communicating endpoints.
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